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THE ROLE OF THE INTERCHANGE FEE ON THE EFFECT OF 








We consider whether banks should be allowed to set different ATM prices to 
their customers depending on whether they hold an account on the bank. In Massoud 
and Bernhardt (2002), without considering an interchange fee, a ban on price 
discrimination on ATM services increases total surplus. In the present model that 
considers an interchange fee, the effect of a ban on price discrimination depends on the 
way the interchange is fixed. If it is fixed to maximize the profits of banks, forbidding 
price discrimination reduces total surplus. However, if the interchange is fixed to 
maximize total surplus, banning price discrimination increases total surplus. 
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Banks not only provide banking services but also ATM services to their customers. When a
consumer withdraws money from an ATM of his bank (home bank) she may be charged what is
called an "on-us" fee.1 If she withdraws money from an ATM belonging to a bank with whom
she has no account (foreign bank), the transaction can be a⁄ected by three di⁄erent prices.
First, the owner of the ATM can charge the customer what is called as a surcharge, the bank of
the consumer can charge her the foreign fee whereas the owner of the ATM charges the bank of
the consumer the interchange fee.
The present paper wants to contribute to the debate on whether banks should be allowed
to charge di⁄erent ATM prices to their customers depending on whether they hold an account
on the bank. In other words, if "on-us" fees and surcharges can take di⁄erent values. This
topic is analyzed in Massoud and Bernhardt (2002). They study a model where the ATM
and the banking market are embedded in the same spatial framework: the banking and the
ATM services are provided in the same location. To simplify matters, they exclude from the
analysis the existence of either a foreign or an interchange fee. They obtain that a ban on price
discrimination increases social welfare.
We want to reevaluate their results when the presence of foreign and interchange fees are
taken into account. For tractability, we eliminate the spatial nature of the ATM market and we
modelled it as in Chioveanu et al. (2007). We consider that ATMs are deployed in locations
that are reached by consumers with an exogenous probability. Then ATM prices do not a⁄ect
the choice of ATMs but the level to which they are used.
We obtain that the introduction of the interchange fee adds a new dimension to the decision
1Although less than 1% of banks impose "on-us" fees on home transactions.
2to whether to allow price discrimination. If price discrimination is banned, the interchange fee
a⁄ects both the account fees and the ATM prices. If instead price discrimination is allowed, the
interchange fee is completely neutralized, because one of the prices becomes redundant.
The social convenience of the ban on price discrimination will depend on who is in charge of
choosing the interchange fee. If it is chosen by banks to maximize joint pro￿ts, we obtain that
the ban on price discrimination reduces social welfare, because the power of banks is used against
the social interest. However, if the interchange is ￿xed to maximize total surplus, banning price
discrimination increases total surplus.
The assumption that the interchange fee is chosen cooperatively by banks is more common in
the theoretical work (Donze and Dubek (2006) and it also sounds more realistic . For example,
in February 2006, the Italian Competition Authority started a comprehensive investigation of
the Italian Banking Association (ABI) and its electronic banking unit Co.Ge.Ban whose main
concern was precisely the cooperative determination of the interchange fee, which could prevent
competition and violate Art. 81 of the EC Treaty.
This paper is an extension of Chioveanu et al. (2007) where the basic di⁄erence between
both papers is that in Chioveanu et al. (2007), ATM prices are chosen after consumers has
subscribed to a bank whereas here they are chosen simultaneously with the account fee. It turns
out that the order of moves considered here complicates very much the computations for the case
with price discrimination, so that we are forced to consider symmetric banks. Chioveanu et al.
(2007) are able to consider the asymmetric case and this allows them to study the deployment
of ATMS. Despite the di⁄erent order of moves, Chioveanu et al. (2007) also obtain that the
interchange fee is neutral when price discrimination is allowed.
In the next setction, the model of the paper is presented. In Section 3, the main results of
the paper are obtained. Then in the last section ￿nal comments put the paper to an end.
32 Model
We consider a model with two banks (A and B) located on the extremes of a segment of unit
length where consumers￿locations are uniformly distributed. They obtain gross utility V from
banking services. Consumers￿transportation cost is given by C(d) = d, where d represents
the distance. In order to open an account at a bank, customers must pay an account fee Fj,
j = A;B. The total number of consumers is normalized to one.
Apart from banking services, banks o⁄er to customers ATM cash withdrawal services. The
marginal costs of providing ATM and banking services are normalized to zero. A customer of
bank j, to use a home ATM of bank j, has to pay the on-us fe pj. In order to use an ATM of a
foreign bank i (with whom the customer does not have an account) she has to pay a surcharge
si to the owner of the ATM and a foreign fee fj to the home bank j. Furthermore, the home
bank pays an interchange fee a to the foreign bank. Our assumptions on the pricing of ATM
transactions are meant to describe actual practices.
ATMs are located in consumer clusters that we call for simplicity, shopping malls. There are
M shopping malls and each bank has one ATM in N di⁄erent shopping malls and no shopping
mall has more than one ATM. In other words, each bank monopolizes the ATM services in
N shopping malls. For coherence, we must have that 0 ￿ N ￿
M
2
. Consumers visit any of
the M available shopping malls with an exogenous equal probability 1
M. Observe that this
assumption implies that the decision to attend a particular shopping mall does depend neither
on the presence of ATMs nor on their pricing policies. Banks cannot a⁄ect consumers￿decision
on where to buy, though they can a⁄ect the payment method chosen. Once at a shopping mall,
consumers require ATM services that can only be satis￿ed in that shopping mall. Changing
location is assumed to be prohibitively costly. Consumers￿valuation of an ATM withdrawal at
a shopping mall is denoted by v, where v is a random draw from a uniform distribution on [0;1].
4We analyze the following three stage game. In the ￿rst stage, bank i (i = A;B) chooses the
account fee (Fi) and the ATM prices: the on-us fee (pi), the foreign fee (fi) and the surcharge
(si). In the second stage, consumers choose a bank where to open an account. In the ￿nal
stage, consumers go to the shopping mall, each of them observes her realization of v and decides
whether to use an ATM (if available) or not. For the moment, we consider that the interchange
fee is exogenously given and that takes values in [0;
2
3
] to avoid corner solutions. Proposition 3
deals with the results given two alternative ways of ￿xing a.
In the last stage, if a customer ends up in a shopping mall with an ATM of her home bank
j, she uses that ATM if her valuation exceeds the ATM fee v ￿ pj. If the customer is at a
shopping mall with an ATM of the foreign bank, she uses the cash dispenser if v ￿ fj + si.
In stage 2, consumers decide where to open an account.2 They have to compare their
expected utility of opening an account at each bank. For a consumer located at x, these are
given respectively by:




N(1 ￿ fA ￿ sB)2
2M
; (1)




N(1 ￿ fB ￿ sA)2
2M
; (2)
Observe that the ￿rst three terms in the expressions above come from general banking services,
whereas the last terms come from ATM services. A customer of bank A has the same probability
N
M




expected utility in a shopping mall with an ATM of the home bank and
(1 ￿ fA ￿ sB)2
2M
is the
expected utility in a shopping mall with a foreign ATM.
Equating (1) with (2), we obtain the market share of bank A:
x =







(1 ￿ pA)2 ￿ (1 ￿ pB)2 + (1 ￿ fA ￿ sB)2 ￿ (1 ￿ fB ￿ sA)2￿
(3)
2We assume that V is high enough so that the market is covered in equilibrium.
5In the second stage, banks choose the account fee and ATM prices. Pro￿ts of ￿rm A are
given by:
￿A = xFA + ￿ATM
A ; (4)
where the ￿rst term captures the revenues of providing banking services and the second term







(x(1 ￿ pA)pA + x(1 ￿ fA ￿ sB)(fA ￿ a) + (1 ￿ x)(1 ￿ fB ￿ sA)(sA + a)) (5)
The ￿rst two terms of this expression capture the expected revenues from own customers
and the last one the revenues from customers of the rival bank. The following proposition shows
the equilibrium prices:
Proposition 1 In the equilibrium with price discrimination: (i) Banks charge a¢ liated ATM
users the marginal cost of the services: p￿
j = 0 and f￿
j = a (ii) Banks set account fees and








￿a respectively (iii) Equilibrium bank pro￿ts and














The ￿rst important result from the above proposition is that real variables as ATM demands
and pro￿ts do not depend on a. The reason is that by inspecting (3, 4 and 5), one realizes
that if one rewrites pro￿ts by using new variables s0
j = sj + a and f0
j = fj ￿ a, pro￿ts do not
depend on a. Then the equilibrium values of s0
j and f0
j are independent of a. Therefore neither
demands (that depend on s0
j + f0





on the interchange fee. This neutrality of the interchange fee distinguishes the case with price
discrimination from the case without price discrimination.
The pricing of own customers follows the pattern of two-part tari⁄ pricing: services are
priced at marginal cost and all the rents are extracted through the ￿xed part. The account fee
is higher than the one we would have without the ATM market. The reason is that only from
6nomembers banks obtain ATM revenues, because the ATM services of members are priced at
marginal cost and this implies that they have less incentives to attract customers.
Now, we analyze the case where banks can not discriminate between members and nonmem-
bers i.e. sj = pj. Taking into account this equality, the stages three and four follow the same
lines as the preceding analysis. Then, in stage 2, banks choose prices whose equilibrium values
are shown in the next proposition:
Proposition 2 In the equilibrium without price discrimination: (i) Foreign fees are set to mar-
ginal cost fu
j = a. (ii) Account fees and prices of ATMs are set respectively to Fu






















N(4 + 4a ￿ 3a2)
16M
.




highest value the interchange fee can take) both yield the same results. Then, the case with
price discrimination corresponds to the case without price discrimination when the interchange
is ￿xed to a =
2
3
. This will help to understand the later discussion about the convenience of the
ban on price discrimination.
In Massoud and Bernhardt (2002) one of the main results is that without price discrimination,
the market for banking services and ATMs are completely separated. We see that when we
introduce the interchange and the foreign fee this is no longer the case (except, of course, when
a = 0). The reason is that banks obtain more expected revenues from nonmembers and this
di⁄erence increases with a. Then the higher a, the lower the incentives to attract customers and
the higher the account fee.
In Massoud and Bernhardt (2002) they obtain the result that price of ATMs without price
discrimination is higher than the surcharge. We obtain the opposite result for any value of a.
7The result of Massoud and Bernhardt (2002) is surprising, because one would tend to think
that banks would in￿ ate surcharges to increase their customer base. However, Massoud and
Bernhardt (2002) identify a countervailing e⁄ect coming from the competition for ATM services.
With price discrimination, the competing bank prices home transactions at marginal cost and
therefore to attract the customers of the other bank she has to price foreign ATM transactions
very aggressively. They show that this e⁄ect dominates. In our model, this latter e⁄ect does
not exist, because we do not have competition for ATM services. Then, the intention to increase
market share explains the comparison of prices with and without price discrimination.
The pro￿ts are decreasing in the interchange fee. This results from the balance of two
opposite e⁄ects. On the one hand, increases in a increase collusion in the market for banking
services. On the other hand, it reduces the revenues in the ATM market, because it distorts pj
away from its ATM revenue maximizing level of
1
2
. It turns out that the second e⁄ect dominates.




￿a, while the cost of foreign ATMs increase by
1
4
￿a. Then it is easy to
understand that the overall e⁄ect is positive for consumers given that they use foreign and home
ATMs with the same probability.
Comparing the two preceding propositions, we have a clear-cut comparison of both pro￿ts
and consumer surplus in the two regimes. Pro￿ts are higher without price discrimination whereas
consumer surplus is always higher with price discrimination. This result follows from the
fact that both regimes coincide when a = 2
3 and pro￿ts are decreasing in a and consumer
surplus increasing in a without price discrimination. Therefore, any policy to forbid the use
of price discrimination has the e⁄ect of bene￿tting banks wile making consumers worse-o⁄.
As far as pro￿ts are concerned, this result corresponds to the one obtained by Massoud and
Bernhardt (2002) while as far as consumer surplus is concerned we obtain a clear e⁄ect of price
8discrimination while their result was ambiguous.
3 The welfare analysis of the ban on price discrimination
Total welfare without price discrimination is given by:




N(12 + 4a ￿ 5a2)
M
(6)
Social welfare with price discrimination is W(2
3). We have that W(a)￿W(2
3) ￿ 0 i⁄ 2
15 ￿ a < 2
3.
Then for those values of a, a ban on price discrimination would increase total welfare.
So far, we have performed the analysis assuming that the interchange fee was exogenous.
Now, we enlarge the game analyzed in the previous section to include two initial stages. In
the ￿rst one (stage -1), a social welfare maximizing planner decides on whether to ban price
discrimination or not. In the second one (stage 0), banks cooperatively choose the interchange
fee to maximize joint pro￿ts. And then stages 1,2 and 3 as de￿ned above proceed.
In Stage 0, the decision of banks depends on whether there is a ban on price discrimination.
If there is a ban, we know that bank pro￿ts are decreasing in the interchange fee, so that
banks would set the interchange fee equal to marginal cost a = 0. If there is no ban on
price discrimination, pro￿ts do not depend on a, so that the decision on the interchange fee is
irrelevant.
In Stage -1, the planner decides whether to ban price discrimination. If there is no ban,
total welfare is given by W(2
3). If price discrimination is banned, the planner knows that in the
following stages banks will choose a = 0 and total welfare will amount to W(0). As it was said
at the beginning of this section we have that W(2
3) > W(0) and therefore price discrimination
is not banned by the planner.
So far we have limited the scope of state regulation to whether price discrimination was
9allowed or not. One could also analyze what happens if regulation is extended so that the social
planner controls the choice of the interchange fee. Then, society can not be worse-o⁄ without




. The idea is that the greater freedom the planner has without price discrimination
can not go against the social interest. It is easy to check that (6) is maximized in a = 2
5 and
therefore welfare is strictly higher banning price discrimination. It is interesting to note that
the optimal interchange fee is higher than the marginal cost.
Next proposition summarizes the main results of this section.
Proposition 3 If the interchange fee is chosen cooperatively by ￿rms, social welfare is higher
with price discrimination. If the interchange fee is chosen by a social welfare maximizing planner,
social welfare is higher when price discrimination is forbidden.
As propositions 1 and 2 show the interchange fee is neutral with price discrimination while
it has an important e⁄ect on prices without price discrimination. Then the convenience of the
ban depends on whom holds the power to choose the interchange fee. If it is chosen by a social
planner, it is optimal to ban price discrimination in order to be able to a⁄ect welfare through
a. If it is chosen by banks, it is optimal to allow price discrimination to turn the choice of a
irrelevant, because bank choice severely reduces welfare.
One last comment about the timing we have chosen. If the order of moves was reversed i.e.
banks chose ￿rst the interchange fee and then the planner decided on the ban, things would
change considerably. Banks would choose the lowest interchange fee such that the planner
decides to ban price discrimination. For what it is said at the beginning of the section, this
value is a = 2
15.
104 Conclusions
The present paper contributes to the debate on whether banks should be allowed to charge
di⁄erent ATM prices to their customers depending on whether they hold an account on the
bank. In other words, if "on-us" fees and surcharges can take di⁄erent values. The social
convenience of the ban on price discrimination depends on who is in charge of choosing the
interchange fee. The most realistic assumption is that it is chosen by banks to maximize joint
pro￿ts. In this case, we obtain that the ban on price discrimination reduces social welfare.
However, if the interchange is ￿xed to maximize total surplus, a ban on price discrimination
increases total surplus.
5 Appendix
With price discrimination, the optimality of the strategy given in the proposition is proven the
following way. Consider that banks choose f0
j = fj ￿a and s0
j = sj +a in order that a disappears
in the expression of the pro￿ts. We analyze the optimal strategy of bank A given that B plays
the equilibrium strategies: pB = 0; f0





3. Bank A will optimally
set the price of ATMs for own customers at marginal cost. Then pA = 0 and f0
A = 0. Then its
pro￿t function is only a function of the surcharge and the account fee ￿A(s0
A;FA). The only































Without price discrimination, We analyze the optimal strategy of bank A given that B plays
the equilibrium strategies: fu
B = a, Fu










. We know that banks
will price the ATM services of own customers at marginal cost and therefore fA = a. Then the
11pro￿t function of A only depends on pA and FA. It is easy to see that this function is concave
on those variables.
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